LAWS PAGES

(Page 9 of 10)

U.S. Supreme Court
MIRANDA v. ARIZONA, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)

Footnotes:

* Together with No. 760, Vignera v. New York, on certiorari to the Court of Appeals of New York and No. 761, Westover v. United States, on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, both argued February 28-March 1, 1966, and No. 584, California v. Stewart, on certiorari to the Supreme Court of California, argued February 28-March 2, 1966.

  1. Compare United States v. Childress, 347 F.2d 448 (C.A. 7th Cir.1965), with Collins v. Beto, 348 F.2d 823 (C.A. 5th Cir.1965). Compare People v. Dorado, 62 Cal.2d 338, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal.Rptr. 169 (1964), with People v. Hartgraves, 31 Ill.2d 375, 202 N.E.2d 33 (1964).
  2. See, e.g., Enker & Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 Minn.L.Rev. 47 (1964); Herman, The Supreme Court and Restrictions on Police Interrogation, 25 Ohio St.L.J. 449 (1964); Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure, in Criminal Justice in Our Time 1 (1965); Dowling, Escobedo and Beyond: The Need for a Fourteenth Amendment Code of Criminal Procedure, 56 J.Crim.L., C. & P. S. 143, 156 (1965). The complex problems also prompted discussions by jurists. Compare Bazelon, Law, Morality, and Civil Liberties, 12 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 13 (1964), with Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 Calif.L.Rev. 929 (1965).
  3. For example,:
    1. The Los Angeles Police Chief stated that, If the police are required . . . to . . . establish that the defendant was apprised of his constitutional guarantees of silence and legal counsel prior to the uttering of any admission or confession, and that he intelligently waived these guarantees . . . a whole Pandora's box is opened as to under what circumstances . . . can a defendant intelligently waive these rights. . . . Allegations that modern criminal investigation can compensate for the lack of a confession or admission in every criminal case is totally absurd!
    2. Parker, 40 L.A.Bar Bull. 603, 607, 642 (1965). His prosecutorial counterpart, District Attorney Younger, stated that: [I]t begins to appear that many of these seemingly restrictive decisions are going to contribute directly to a more effective, efficient and professional level of law enforcement.
    3. L.A. Times, Oct. 2, 1965, p. 1. The former Police Commissioner of New York, Michael J. Murphy, stated of Escobedo: What the Court is doing is akin to requiring one boxer to fight by Marquis of Queensbury rules while permitting the other to butt, gouge and bite.
    4. N.Y. Times, May 14, 1965, p. 39. The former United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, David C. Acheson, who is presently Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury (for Enforcement), and directly in charge of the Secret Service and the Bureau of Narcotics, observed that: Prosecution procedure has, at most, only the most remote causal connection with crime. Changes in court decisions and prosecution procedure would have about the same effect on the crime rate as an aspirin would have on a tumor of the brain.
    5. Quoted in Herman, supra, n. 2, at 500, n. 270. Other views on the subject in general are collected in Weisberg, Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical View, 52 J.Crim.L., C. & P.S. 21 (1961).
  4. This is what we meant in Escobedo when we spoke of an investigation which had focused on an accused.
  5. See, for example, IV National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement (1931) [Wickersham Report]; Booth, Confessions, and Methods Employed in Procuring Them, 4 So. Calif.L.Rev. 83 (1930); Kauper, Judicial Examination of the Accused — A Remedy for the Third Degree, 30 Mich.L.Rev. 1224 (1932). It is significant that instances of third-degree treatment of prisoners almost invariably took place during the period between arrest and preliminary examination. Wickersham Report, at 169; Hall, The Law of Arrest in Relation to Contemporary Social Problems, 3 U.Chi.L.Rev. 345, 357 (1936). See also Foote, Law and Police Practice: Safeguards in the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw.U.L.Rev. 16 (1957).
  6. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); Canty v. Alabama, 309 U.S. 629 (1940); White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940); Vernon v. Alabama, 313 U.S. 547 (1941); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954). See also Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951).
  7. In addition, see People v. Wakat, 415 Ill. 610, 114 N.E.2d 706 (1953); Wakat v. Harlib, 253 F.2d 59 (C.A. 7th Cir.1958) (defendant suffering from broken bones, multiple bruises and injuries sufficiently serious to require eight months' medical treatment after being manhandled by five policemen); Kier v. State, 213 Md. 556, 132 A.2d 494 (1957) (police doctor told accused, who was strapped to a chair completely nude, that he proposed to take hair and skin scrapings from anything that looked like blood or sperm from various parts of his body); Bruner v. People, 113 Colo.194, 156 P.2d 111 (1945) (defendant held in custody over two months, deprived of food for 15 hours, forced to submit to a lie detector test when he wanted to go to the toilet); People v. Matlock, 51 Cal.2d 682, 336 P.2d 505 (1959) (defendant questioned incessantly over an evening's time, made to lie on cold board and to answer questions whenever it appeared he was getting sleepy). Other cases are documented in American Civil Liberties Union, Illinois Division, Secret Detention by the Chicago Police (1959); Potts, The Preliminary Examination and "The Third Degree," 2 Baylor L.Rev. 131 (1950); Sterling, Police Interrogation and the Psychology of Confession, 14 J.Pub.L. 25 (1965).
  8. The manuals quoted in the text following are the most recent and representative of the texts currently available. Material of the same nature appears in Kidd, Police Interrogation (1940); Mulbar, Interrogation (1951); Dienstein, Technics for the Crime Investigator 97-115 (1952). Studies concerning the observed practices of the police appear in LaFave, Arrest: The Decision To Take a Suspect Into Custody 244-437, 490-521 (1965); LaFave, Detention for Investigation by the Police: An Analysis of Current Practices, 1962 Wash.U.L.Q. 331; Barrett, Police Practices and the Law — From Arrest to Release or Charge, 50 Calif.L.Rev. 11 (1962); Sterling, supra, n. 7, at 47-65.
  9. The methods described in Inbau & Reid, Criminal Interrogation and Confessions (1962), are a revision and enlargement of material presented in three prior editions of a predecessor text, Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation (3d ed.1953). The authors and their associates are officers of the Chicago Police Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory, and have had extensive experience in writing, lecturing and speaking to law enforcement authorities over a 20-year period. They say that the techniques portrayed in their manuals reflect their experiences, and are the most effective psychological stratagems to employ during interrogations. Similarly, the techniques described in O'Hara, Fundamentals of Criminal Investigation (1956), were gleaned from long service as observer, lecturer in police science, and work as a federal criminal investigator. All these texts have had rather extensive use among law enforcement agencies and among students of police science, with total sales and circulation of over 44,000.
  10. Inbau & Reid, Criminal Interrogation and Confessions (1962), at 1.
  11. O'Hara, supra, at 99.
  12. Inbau & Reid, supra, at 34-43, 87. For example, in Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954), the interrogator-psychiatrist told the accused, "We do sometimes things that are not right, but in a fit of temper or anger we sometimes do things we aren't really responsible for," id. at 562, and again, "We know that morally, you were just in anger. Morally, you are not to be condemned," id. at 582.
  13. Inbau Reid, supra, at 43-55.
  14. O'Hara, supra, at 112.
  15. Inbau & Reid, supra, at 40.
  16. Ibid.
  17. O'Hara, supra, at 104, Inbau & Reid, supra, at 58-59. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959). A variant on the technique of creating hostility is one of engendering fear. This is perhaps best described by the prosecuting attorney in Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 407 (1945): Why this talk about being undressed? Of course, they had a right to undress him to look for bullet scars, and keep the clothes off him. That was quite proper police procedure. That is some more psychology — let him sit around with a blanket on him, humiliate him there for a while; let him sit in the corner, let him think he is going to get a shellacking.
  18. O'Hara, supra, at 105-106.
  19. Id. at 106.
  20. Inbau & Reid, supra, at 111.
  21. Ibid.
  22. Inbau & Reid, supra, at 112.
  23. Inbau & Reid, Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation 185 (3d ed.1953).
  24. Interrogation procedures may even give rise to a false confession. The most recent conspicuous example occurred in New York, in 1964, when a Negro of limited intelligence confessed to two brutal murders and a rape which he had not committed. When this was discovered, the prosecutor was reported as saying: Call it what you want — brainwashing, hypnosis, fright. They made him give an untrue confession. The only thing I don't believe is that Whitmore was beaten. N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1965, p. 1, col. 5. In two other instances, similar events had occurred. N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1964, p. 22, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1965, p. 1, col. 1. In general, see Borchard, Convicting the Innocent (1932); Frank & Frank, Not Guilty (1957).
  25. In the fourth confession case decided by the Court in the 1962 Term, Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), our disposition made it unnecessary to delve at length into the facts. The facts of the defendant's case there, however, paralleled those of his codefendants, whose confessions were found to have resulted from continuous and coercive interrogation for 27 hours, with denial of requests for friends or attorney. See United States v. Murphy, 222 F.2d 698 (C.A.2d Cir.1955) (Frank, J.); People v. Bonino, 1 N.Y.2d 752, 135 N.E.2d 51 (1956).
  26. The absurdity of denying that a confession obtained under these circumstances is compelled is aptly portrayed by an example in Professor Sutherland's recent article, Crime and Confession, 79 Harv.L.Rev. 21, 37 (1965): Suppose a well-to-do testatrix says she intends to will her property to Elizabeth. John and James want her to bequeath it to them instead. They capture the testatrix, put her in a carefully designed room, out of touch with everyone but themselves and their convenient "witnesses," keep her secluded there for hours while they make insistent demands, weary her with contradictions of her assertions that she wants to leave her money to Elizabeth, and finally induce her to execute the will in their favor. Assume that John and James are deeply and correctly convinced that Elizabeth is unworthy, and will make base use of the property if she gets her hands on it, whereas John and James have the noblest and most righteous intentions. Would any judge of probate accept the will so procured as the "voluntary" act of the testatrix?
  27. Thirteenth century commentators found an analogue to the privilege grounded in the Bible. "To sum up the matter, the principle that no man is to be declared guilty on his own admission is a divine decree." Maimonides, Mishneh Torah (Code of Jewish Law), Book of Judges, Laws of the Sanhedrin, c. 18, 116, III Yale Judaica Series 52-53. See also Lamm, The Fifth Amendment and Its Equivalent in the Halakhah, 5 Judaism 53 (Winter 1956).
  28. See Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 Minn.L.Rev. 1, 9-11 (1949); 8 Wigmore, Evidence 289-295 (McNaughton rev.1961). See also Lowell, The Judicial Use of Torture, Parts I and II, 11 Harv.L.Rev. 220, 290 (1897).
  29. See Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in America, 21 Va.L.Rev. 763 (1935); Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 , 445-449 (1956) (DOUGLAS, J., dissenting).
  30. Compare Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955).
  31. Brief for the United States, p. 28. To the same effect, see Brief for the United States, pp. 40-49, n. 44, Anderson v. United States, 318 U.S. 350 (1943); Brief for the United States, pp. 17-18, McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
  32. Our decision today does not indicate in any manner, of course, that these rules can be disregarded. When federal officials arrest an individual, they must as always comply with the dictates of the congressional legislation and cases thereunder. See generally Hogan & Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue, 47 Geo.L.J. 1 (1958).
  33. The decisions of this Court have guaranteed the same procedural protection for the defendant whether his confession was used in a federal or state court. It is now axiomatic that the defendant's constitutional rights have been violated if his conviction is based, in whole or in part, on an involuntary confession, regardless of its truth or falsity. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961); Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1 (1924). This is so even if there is ample evidence aside from the confession to support the conviction, e.g., Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 404 (1945); Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 540-542 (1897). Both state and federal courts now adhere to trial procedures which seek to assure a reliable and clear-cut determination of the voluntariness of the confession offered at trial, Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36, 38 (1951); see also Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 624 (1896). Appellate review is exacting, see Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960). Whether his conviction was in a federal or state court, the defendant may secure a post-conviction hearing based on the alleged involuntary character of his confession, provided he meets the procedural requirements, Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). In addition, see Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
  34. See Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 241 (1941); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
  35. The police also prevented the attorney from consulting with his client. Independent of any other constitutional proscription, this action constitutes a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel, and excludes any statement obtained in its wake. See People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963) (Fuld, J.)
  36. In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 340-352 (1957) (BLACK, J., dissenting); Note, 73 Yale L.J. 1000, 1048-1051 (1964); Comm